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AIN’T NO TELLING (WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES
ARE EXCEPTIONAL)
DAVID CAMPBELL* AND PHILIP WYLIE**
1. INTRODUCTION
IN Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc., Edward
Chalpin,1 the Court of Appeal gives further impetus to the radical
recasting of the law of damages for breach of contract along
restitutionary lines made possible by A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape
Ltd. Third Party).2 Whilst Blake made it more diﬃcult to argue
that hypothetical release damages were compensatory rather than
restitutionary in nature, it left a residue of serious uncertainty
because it did not make it impossible to do so. Hendrix goes a long
way towards eradicating this particular uncertainty by awarding
hypothetical release damages on an unambiguously restitutionary
basis and saying that an account of proﬁts, though not justiﬁed in
the circumstances of the case, might also have been awarded on
this basis. In the belief that Blake ‘‘marks a new start in this area’’
[para. 16], Hendrix provides, in the abstract at least, the general
restitutionary remedy Blake posits, of damages uniﬁed on a ‘‘sliding
scale’’ from partial disgorgement (by hypothetical release damages)
through to complete disgorgement (by an account of proﬁts). As
this sliding scale is the logical implication of Blake, it is a virtue of
Hendrix to have taken the argument to this next stage.
Unfortunately, this pursuit of the logic of Blake necessarily
involves the ‘‘far reaching and disruptive’’ consequences for
commercial law feared by Lord Hobhouse in his powerful dissent
in Blake.3 As it happens, Hendrix, the second case to follow Blake,
is not as disruptive as the ﬁrst to do so, Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v.
NIAD Ltd.,4 because the new remedy it extends to claimants is not
* Cardiﬀ Law School and E.S.R.C. Research Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability,
Sustainability and Society (BRASS).
** Cardiﬀ Law School. We should like to thank Hugh Collins, Don Harris, Steve Hedley, Paddy
Ireland, Peter Jaﬀey, Howard Johnson, Bob Lee and Christopher McNall for their comments.
Ain’t No Telling was ﬁrst recorded by the Jimi Hendrix Experience on 26 October 1967 and
ﬁrst released on their album Axis: Bold as Love on 1 December 1967.
1 [2003] EWCA Civ 323. Unattributed references in square brackets are to this transcript.
2 [1997] Ch. 84 (Ch.D.); [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.) and [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.).
3 Ibid., 299D-E (H.L.).
4 Unreported, 22 November 2001 (Ch.D.). In C.M.S. Dolphin Ltd. v. Paul Maurice Simonet,
Blue (G.B.) Ltd. [2001] Emp LR 895, in which judgment was given some six months earlier
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as far-reaching as the one extended in Esso v. NIAD;5 and, for
good or ill, the same or a better result for Experience Hendrix LLC
might have been reached on the law prior to Blake.6 Nevertheless,
making it more likely that these far reaching and disruptive
consequences will come to pass is the central feature of the
reasoning in Hendrix. Though partial and complete disgorgement
are now available, the sliding scale which would coherently unite
both is the purest chimera. What appears to be a scale if the
discussion is conducted at a completely abstract level is, as a
practical matter, a very loose collection of sometimes profoundly
arbitrary damages quantiﬁcations. Even worse, purporting to
construct the scale involves an argument which one of the present
authors dismissed as ‘‘ridiculous in itself ’’ when, some years ago, he
perceived it as a logically possible consequence of Blake.7 To see
this possibility realised in Hendrix does not, we are afraid, make it
less ridiculous, and that this distinguished Court of Appeal takes up
such a position shows just how inappropriate restitutionary
damages would be as a generally available remedy for breach of
contract, though this general availability is precisely what Blake
and now Hendrix move towards.
2. THE SLIDING SCALE IN THEORY
The claimant in Hendrix is a company owned by the family of Jimi
Hendrix, who are the remaining beneﬁciaries of his estate. Hendrix
was a rock musician who died in 1970, aged 27, from an overdose
of sleeping drugs. From the middle of 1966 until his death, Hendrix
enjoyed enormous success and this period of his life was a
combination of intense musical activity and hectic personal aﬀairs.
The brevity of his career has not prevented his posthumous
reputation from being very great. All adult rock music fans would
acknowledge that a good case can be made that he was the most
innovative rock guitarist who has ever played, and the claimants
continue to earn very large sums from the sale of his recordings.
In 1965, before he became successful, Hendrix entered into an
exclusive service agreement of three years’ duration with the present
ﬁrst defendant, a company then and now largely under the control
of the present second defendant, Mr. Edward Chalpin, and we shall
take the interests of PPX and Mr. Chalpin to be identical. Prior to
than Esso v. NIAD, Lawrence Collins J. (at para. [142]) was prepared to award an account on
the authority of Blake but did not ﬁnd it necessary to do so.
5 See note 46 below.
6 See section 6 below.
7 D. Harris et al., Remedies in Contract and Tort, 2nd. edn. (London 2002), p. 267. Much of
Campbell’s thinking on this topic has been formed in the course of joint work with Donald
Harris and Roger Halson.
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1965, Hendrix was not a ‘‘featured artist’’. After his medical
discharge from the army in 1962, he became a ‘‘sideman’’, largely
playing guitar in support of other artists. The 1965 exclusive service
agreement would have conﬁned Hendrix to being a sideman to the
now obscure Curtis Knight, a musician managed by Mr. Chalpin.
In 1967, PPX sued Hendrix for breach of this agreement, and after
his death continued the action against his estate. In 1973, the
action was settled on terms which, inter alia, restricted PPX’s rights
to exploit Curtis Knight recordings on which Hendrix played and
of which PPX possessed master copies. In 1995 and 1999, PPX
entered into agreements with third parties to exploit these
recordings which Buckley J. at ﬁrst instance found to be in breach
of the 1973 settlement.8 Buckley J. granted an injunction against
further exploitation of these recordings by PPX but denied damages
or an account of proﬁts, and it is the claimant’s appeal against this
part of the judgment that is of interest here. Dismissing other issues
in the appeal questioning liability, the Court of Appeal held that
both damages and an account could have been available on
restitutionary grounds, though on the facts awarded only the
former.
Both before Buckley J.9 and before the Court of Appeal
[para. 14], the claimant maintained from the outset that damages
quantiﬁed on what it called the ‘‘traditional’’ basis of compensation
for lost expectation could not be recovered for want of certainty.
This quantiﬁcation would have required an assessment of the
volume of sales of the claimant’s recordings lost as a result of the
release of the defendant’s recordings, and the claimant maintained
that ‘‘[s]uch an assessment would, from a practical point of view,
be impossible’’.10 The claimant therefore framed two alternative
bases of quantiﬁcation: (1) ‘‘the Wrotham Park Estates basis’’, or
(2) an account of proﬁts on the authority of Blake.11 What is novel
about Hendrix is that it puts both of these remedies on a uniﬁed
restitutionary footing, as a matter of doctrine at least.
The Wrotham Park Estates basis of course refers to Brightman
J.’s ‘‘beneﬁcent interpretation’’12 of Lord Cairns’ Act13 in Wrotham
Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes.14 As is now well enough
understood as to need no exposition here,15 these are
‘‘hypothetical release’’ damages representing what the claimant
8 Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc., Edward Chalpin [2002] EWHC 1353 (Q.B.).
9 Ibid., at para. [49].
10 Ibid; see further pp. 612–613 below.
11 Ibid.
12 A.-G. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109, 286.
13 Chancery Amendment Act 1858, s. 2 (now Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 50).
14 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.
15 Harris et al., note 7 above, pp. 255–258, 488–491.
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could have charged the defendant for permission to, in this case,
release its recordings, had such permission been sought rather
than, as it were, simply assumed by breach. These damages have
been taken to be compensation for the hypothetical lost
opportunity to bargain for the release, but the attempt to do so in
cases such as Jaggard v. Sawyer16 has been beset with many
diﬃculties.17 Blake has done much to put these damages on a
restitutionary rather than a compensatory footing. In Hendrix, the
Court of Appeal, without any argument that really adds to
previous discussions of the matter, takes it that this is the best
footing for these damages. Though Jaggard v. Sawyer is not
followed [paras. 16, 34], no sustained argument for this is given.
However, as we agree that this is the right doctrinal line to take
after Blake, we will say no more about it here and assess the
consequences of it being established that these damages are
restitutionary in nature.
The ﬁrst consequence is that these damages can be described as
eﬀecting partial disgorgement of the wrongful proﬁts which the
defendant obtains by breach. If one asks what sum the defendant
would have paid to be released from his contractual obligations,
the only answer which seems to be ruled out is 100 per cent. of the
proﬁt he hopes to make, for surely it cannot be maintained that
any rational defendant would agree to pay that price for release,
which completely removes the incentive he had to seek that release.
In Wrotham Park, Brightman J. by no means maintained this but
instead awarded the claimant merely 5 per cent. of the proﬁt the
defendant made.18 This is a rudimentary form of apportionment
which, as we say, eﬀects partial disgorgement of the defendant’s
proﬁt.
Though the origins of the account of proﬁts remedy lay in
equity, it is ﬁrmly established that this may be regarded as a
restitutionary remedy eﬀecting total disgorgement of the defendant’s
proﬁts.19 As such, it is an obvious complement to hypothetical
release damages. The two together seem to provide a full range of
restitutionary remedies for breach of contract, on a ‘‘sliding scale’’
extending from various levels of partial disgorgement (hypothetical
release damages) to total disgorgement (account of proﬁts).20 This
position certainly was implicit particularly in Lord Nicholl’s speech
16 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 269.
17 Harris et al., note 7 above, 255–262.
18 Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798, 815–816.
19 My Kinda Town v. Soll [1983] R.P.C. 15, 55.
20 The felicitous term ‘‘sliding scale’’ is used by Professor Burrows in comments on the
Restitution Discussion Group email forum: henrichment@lists.mcgill.cai.
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in Blake,21 and has been made explicit in a recent account of his
extra-judicial views:
Once one had crossed the threshold of being able to recover an
account of proﬁts for breach of contract, rather than
compensatory damages or speciﬁc relief, Lord Nicholls thought
that the measure of recovery could extend from expense saved
through to stripping a proportion of the proﬁts made through
to stripping all the proﬁts made from the breach. The
Wrotham Park Estate case (where 5 [per cent.] of the proﬁts
had been stripped) was therefore based on the same principles
as A.-G. v. Blake (where all the proﬁts had been stripped).22
Though, as we shall see,23 the distinction between hypothetical
release damages and an account of proﬁts does not in practice
disappear, looking at the matter purely from an abstract,
classiﬁcatory perspective, all that is left is to replace these usages
with ‘‘partial’’ and ‘‘total’’ disgorgement and the range of
restitutionary remedies constituting an alternative to remedies based
on expectation will be complete.24
3. THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST
If one accepts the approach set out by Blake, it would indeed, as
the Court of Appeal holds in Hendrix [para. 43], be ‘‘anomalous
and unjust’’ if PPX did not have to pay some measure of
restitutionary damages for the gains it made by breach. The
obvious problem with this is that, whatever the intrinsic merits of
this approach, remedies for breach of contract have previously been
based on compensation of loss, and the generalised restitutionary
approach threatens to demolish the structure of those remedies. To
avoid this, Blake aﬃrms that it continues to be ‘‘axiomatic’’ that
damages for breach of contract are normally compensatory25 and
restitutionary departures from this are, though a growing category
which will be ‘‘hammered out on the anvil of concrete cases’’,26 to
21 Harris et al., note 7 above, pp. 261–262.
22 A. Burrows and E. Peel (eds.), Commercial Remedies (Oxford 2003), p. 129.
23 See section 4 below.
24 The various distinctions which have been drawn between ‘‘restitution’’ and ‘‘disgorgement’’
(e.g. L.D. Smith, ‘‘The Province of the Law of Restitution’’ (1992) 71 Can. B. Rev. 672, 683–
694; P. Jaﬀey, The Nature and Scope of Restitution (Oxford 2002) chs. 4, 11–13; and J.
Edelman, Gain-based Damages (Oxford 2002), ch. 3) also now disappear, in theory at least,
into the uniﬁed sliding scale, for in the light of Blake they now appear to be mere staging
posts on the progress towards the creation of that scale, in which unjust enrichment itself
disappears into the category of wrongs: P. Birks, ‘‘Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful
Enrichment’’ (2001) 79 Texas L. Rev. 1767. The ‘‘sliding scale’’ thinking is applied to a
critique of Edelman in A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 2nd. edn. (London 2002),
pp. 461–462.
25 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [1998] Ch. 439, 456E (C.A.) and [2001] 1
A.C. 268, 282B (H.L.).
26 Ibid., 291F (H.L.).
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take place only in ‘‘exceptional circumstances’’.27 By dispensing
with Jaggard v. Sawyer and related cases, Hendrix sacriﬁces one set
of brakes upon the restitutionary argument to the logic of that
argument; but that logic always meant that those brakes could not
hold. At this stage of the progress of the restitutionary juggernaut
it remains the case that a new set of brakes have to be
manufactured and applied, and Hendrix attempts to do so.
Unfortunately, these brakes will prove to be as ineﬀective as the
old.
One way of identifying exceptional circumstances is to ﬁnd
something aggravating about ‘‘the moral calibre of the defendant’s
conduct’’:28 that it was ‘‘deliberate and cynical’’, or involved
‘‘skimping on performance’’ or ‘‘doing exactly what one promised
one would not do’’, have been advanced as aggravating
circumstances.29 Serious reﬂection shows all of these to be
unsatisfactory reasons to depart from compensatory damages,30 and
there was a marked hesitation about all of them in the House of
Lords’ hearing of Blake.31 Despite the Court of Appeal being aware
of this [para. 28], its opinion that ‘‘there has been a deliberate
breach’’ [para. 58] which involved doing ‘‘the very thing [the
defendant] had contracted not to do’’ [para. 36] unarguably played
a part in its decision in Hendrix. As this means that a clear line
over these grounds has not even been maintained between the
House of Lords’ decision in Blake and Hendrix, the second case to
follow it,32 the law is a dreadful mess.33 As we believe nothing
ultimately can be done to straighten this mess out, we leave these
factors related to the defendant and turn to the relative novelty in
Hendrix, its argument about a factor relating to the claimant.
In Blake, Lord Nicholls was anxious to avoid deﬁning
exceptional circumstances and said the following,34 which is quoted
in Hendrix [para. 27]:
No ﬁxed rules can be prescribed. The courts will have regard
to all the circumstances, including the subject matter of the
contract, the purpose of the contractual provision that has
been breached, the circumstances in which the breach occurred,
the consequences of the breach and the circumstances in which
relief is being sought. A useful general guide, although not
27 Ibid., 285G.
28 Ibid., 456H (C.A).
29 Ibid., 457–458.
30 Harris et al., note 7 above, pp. 18–19, 213–214, 274–275, 200–208, 275–276.
31 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 277G, 291D (H.L.).
32 That the defendant ‘‘did the very thing it contracted not to do’’ was decisive in Esso
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. NIAD Ltd., unreported, 22 November 2001 (Ch.D.), at [60].
33 This was predicted in D. Campbell and D. Harris, ‘‘In Defence of Breach: A Critique of
Restitution and the Performance Interest’’ (2002) 22 L.S. 208, 228 n. 109.
34 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 285G–H (H.L.).
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exhaustive, is whether the plaintiﬀ had a legitimate interest in
preventing the defendant’s proﬁt-making activity, and, hence,
in depriving him of his proﬁt.
This ‘‘legitimate interest’’ is central to Hendrix. The reasoning is
stated with economy by Peter Gibson L.J. [para. 58]:
because (1) there has been a deliberate breach by PPX of its
contractual obligations for its own reward, (2) the claimant
would have diﬃculty in establishing ﬁnancial loss therefrom,
and (3) the claimant has a legitimate interest in preventing
PPX’s proﬁt-making activity carried out in breach of PPX’s
contractual obligations, the present case is a suitable one (as
envisaged by Lord Nicholls [in Blake])35 in which damages for
breach of contract may be measured by the beneﬁts gained by
the wrongdoer from the breach. To avoid injustice I would
require [the defendant] to make a reasonable payment in
respect of the beneﬁt it has gained.
It is the failure to prove substantive compensatory damages that
gives the claimant the legitimate interest which allows it to pursue a
restitutionary remedy. It may well be necessary to add to this
legitimate interest one of the variables relating to the defendant’s
conduct in order to actually be awarded the remedy; one can
hardly say as the position is so unclear. But let us look at the
legitimate interest equated with failure to prove substantive
compensatory damages in itself.
The diﬃculties with this equation are enormous. Before turning
to the irremediable and disastrous ones, let us examine a perhaps
irremediable but relatively minor one. If one takes Lord Nicholls’
words repeated by the Court of Appeal at face value, they do not
authorise what was done in Hendrix.36 Lord Nicholls speaks of
‘‘preventing the breach’’. The restitutionary measure which will
come closest to this is an account of proﬁts, for, as we have said, if
the defendant has to give up all the proﬁt he will make by breach,
he has no incentive to breach. But only partial disgorgement was
awarded in Hendrix and that disgorgement will arise only if the
breach is not prevented but allowed to take place so that the proﬁts
to be disgorged will be generated.37 What is being exposed here is
the way that restitutionary remedies, which turn on abhorrence of
‘‘wrongfulness’’ understood widely, are an uncomfortable graft onto
the stock of Lord Cairns’ Act, the purpose of which is not to
35 Ibid., 283H–284A.
36 This diﬃculty was predicted in Harris et al., note 7 above, p. 270.
37 It is an interesting issue, noted by Mance L.J. [para. 26] but not raised by the facts of
Hendrix so far established, whether partial disgorgement should still take place even if, as it
happens, the defendant does not realise any proﬁt at all from the breach. For present
purposes, it is enough to note that the defendant will breach only when he expects to make a
proﬁt (or avoid a loss), and that Lord Cairns’ Act allows him to do so.
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prevent a nuisance, a breach, etc. but to award damages in lieu of
an injunction, i.e. to allow the nuisance, the breach, etc. to take
place, and the ‘‘wrongful proﬁts’’ ﬂowing therefrom to be generated
as a result.38
Deriving Wrotham Park damages from equity therefore must
point in the direction of apportionment as prevention is antithetic
to the purpose of Lord Cairns’ Act. But once these damages are
put on a restitutionary footing, this then points in the direction of
total disgorgement. If the argument is successfully mounted that
the defendant has wrongfully proﬁted from, say, a breach, why is
the claimant conﬁned to getting only part of those proﬁts; or, to
put it the other way around, why does the defendant get to keep
any? However, though we will return to the practical implications
of the tortured way in which Lord Cairns’ Act has been
interpreted since Brightman J.’s ‘‘beneﬁcent interpretation’’ of it,
let us allow the possibility of partial disgorgement and follow the
results.
These results are the doing of exactly what the House of Lords
counselled against in Johnson v. Agnew, treating Lord Cairns’ Act
as providing for ‘‘the assessment of damages on [a] new basis’’.39 In
deﬁance of what even Goﬀ and Jones thought ‘‘historically sound
and correct in principle’’,40 the claimant is now eﬀectively allowed
to choose between the ‘‘traditional’’ and the ‘‘new’’ basis. As we
have seen, in Hendrix the claimant from the outset maintained that
it could not prove a compensatory claim. By doing so, it gained the
legitimate interest and, if the account of proﬁts had been granted,
what it must have believed would be a considerable advantage.41
We do not suggest that the claimant refused to frame an
expectation claim when one could readily have been framed, for
although complicated claims on this basis are commonly made by
those with a more robust attitude to quantiﬁcation than the
claimant displays,42 Hendrix does fall into an ‘‘IPish’’43 area where
proof problems are acknowledged.44 The recordings PPX released
of, as has been noted, Jimi Hendrix as sideman to Curtis Knight,
display very few of Hendrix’s own qualities. The claimant would
38 D. Campbell, ‘‘Hamlet without the Prince: How Leng and Leong Use Restitution to
Extinguish Equity’’ [2003] J.B.L. 131, 133–135.
39 [1989] A.C. 367, 400D.
40 Goﬀ and Jones on the Law of Restitution, 6th. edn. (London 2002), para. 20.019.
41 But see section 6 below.
42 S. Eastwood, ‘‘Breach of Contract, Restitution for Wrongs and Punishment: Comment’’ in
Burrows and Peel (eds.), note 22 above, pp. 125–126; see further M.G. Bridge, ‘‘Expectation
Damages and Uncertain Future Losses’’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann (eds.), Good Faith
and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford 1995), ch. 17.
43 World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2002] F.S.R. 32,
at [63] per Jacob J.
44 United Horse-shoe and Nail Co. Ltd. v. John Stewart and Co. (1888) 13 App. Cas. 401, 413.
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not itself have released these recordings,45 and the argument that
their release would have reduced the volume of the sales of its own
recordings of Hendrix’s music proper would have been diﬃcult to
make in a way which involved quantiﬁcation of the losses
[para. 14]. This, of course, is why, damages being inadequate, an
injunction was granted: this is what the proceedings before Buckley
J. largely were about.
But what is to prevent a future claimant from simply declining
to frame an expectation claim in order to press a restitutionary
claim which it prefers? Any at all complicated consequential loss
claim can easily be depicted as diﬃcult in such a way as to allow
this; and, in any case, it is up to the claimant to advance evidence
of substantial loss of any sort. Unless we envisage surreal
statements of claim in which the defence tries to prove that the
claimant is entitled to substantial damages (perhaps against the
claimant’s denial that this is the case), Hendrix moves towards the
actualisation of the possibility, clearly latent in Blake, of the
claimant having a complete freedom to elect to sue in expectation
or restitution according to which will yield the best results for
him.46 It is indisputable that this possibility exists when, for
example, passing oﬀ 47 or a ﬁduciary duty is involved,48 and
competent counsel will advise comparing the fruits of the diﬀerent
actions. Mehigan and Griﬃth’s authoritative practitioners text on
restraint of trade says in so many words: ‘‘If the plaintiﬀ has not
suﬀered any or only minor loss or thinks that the defendant’s gain
is much greater than his loss, he may be tempted to sue for an
account of proﬁts’’.49 Hendrix will oblige competent counsel to
think of this in simple contract cases,50 with the further
consequence that:
If in the future [claimants] will be able to claim wrongful
proﬁts in the alternative, in every such case the claimant’s
solicitor will be duty bound to demand extensive disclosure in
order to ﬁnd out whether such a claim is worth pursuing.51
45 Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc., Edward Chalpin [2002] EWHC 1353 (Q.B.),
at [50].
46 This clearly is the result of Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. NIAD Ltd., unreported, 22 November
2001 (Ch.D.), at [65], in which the claimant was expressly given a choice of three bases of
quantiﬁcation, including an account.
47 Lever v. Goodwin (1887) L.R. 36 Ch. D. 1, 7.
48 Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley [1972] 2 All E.R. 162.
49 S. Mehigan and D. Griﬃths, Restraint of Trade and Business Secrets, 3rd. edn. (London
1996), p. 320. See further note 68 below.
50 Eastwood, note 42 above, p. 127.
51 The Sine Nomine [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 805, at [3]. The typically casual attitude taken to the
disclosure problems involved in extending restitutionary remedies was noted in D. Campbell,
‘‘The Treatment of Teacher v. Calder in A.-G. v. Blake’’ (2002) 65 M.L.R. 256, 266–268.
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It was to stop exactly this possibility arising generally in
contract that what is taken to be the leading authority for ‘‘eﬃcient
breach’’ in the UK, Teacher v. Calder,52 was defended in Blake,
even as the arguments which were bound to undermine it were put
forward.53 Similarly, The Sine Nomine,54 an arbitration award
published in the Lloyd’s Reports which aﬃrms the possibility of
eﬃcient breach after Blake, was approved in Hendrix [para. 33]; but
this will prove as ineﬀective a brake as the approval of Teacher v.
Calder in Blake. In The Sine Nomine, the defendant owners of a
vessel breached by withdrawing it from the service of the claimant
charterers. The claimants were, of course, entitled to any market
damages they were caused thereby,55 and indeed were awarded
substantial damages of this sort.56 However, though the facts are
not fully laid out, it is a clear implication from those published that
the reason the defendant withdrew the vessel is that it wanted
either to enter into an exceptionally lucrative alternative
charterparty or to make an exceptional proﬁt by carrying its own
cargoes.57 If the claimant was conﬁned to market damages, this
would be an eﬃcient breach in the way this is normally meant,58
and this is what the tribunal did.59 Mance L.J. says of this case:
The tribunal’s understandable conclusion was that an award of
wrongful proﬁts was inappropriate where both parties were
dealing with a marketable commodity (the services of a ship in
that case) for which a substitute can be found on the market
[para. 33].
But how can it be denied that, from a restitutionary perspective,
The Sine Nomine’s denial of a restitutionary remedy (of partial
disgorgement by hypothetical release if not total disgorgement by
an account) is unsupportable?60 The defendant breaches, makes a
52 [1899] A.C. 451, 467 per Lord Davey, 462 per Lord Watson concurring.
53 Harris et al., note 7 above, pp. 263–268 and Campbell, note 51 above, 264.
54 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 805.
55 Ibid., at para. [3].
56 Ibid., 805 col. 1.
57 Perhaps inﬂuenced by language employed at ibid., paras. [4, 10], Mance L.J. [para. 33]
explains the breach by saying that ‘‘the market had risen’’. With respect, this cannot be
enough, for a general rise in the market would leave no margin between what the defendant
hoped to gain by breach and the amount it would be liable to the claimant on normal
principles, and so breach, far from being eﬃcient, would have been senseless. There must have
been what in The Sine Nomine [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 805, at [10] is called ‘‘an adventitious
beneﬁt’’ to explain the defendant’s conduct (and the claimant’s in pursuing this claim).
58 The tribunal reﬁnes the possible measure of ‘‘wrongful proﬁts’’ in a way which is theoretically
correct but need not be discussed here: Ibid., at para. [4].
59 Ibid., at para. [5], following the denial of an account in identical circumstances in The Siboen
and the Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 293, 337 col. 1.
60 Professor Jones obviously disapproves of The Sine Nomine in Goﬀ and Jones, note 40 above,
para. 20.043a, but does not go so far as to say it is wrong. However, the grounds on which
he argues that it ‘‘may have been correct on its facts’’ are, with the greatest respect,
unconvincing. The charterers did prove an expectation loss (note 56 above) and the loss
cannot have been equal to the proﬁts gained (note 57 above).
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proﬁt by so doing, and disgorges nothing (unless one somewhat
unscrupulously regards the market damages which were paid for
compensatory reasons as partial disgorgement).61 Mance L.J.’s
ground for distinguishing the cases simply does not speak to the
matter. Or rather, it shows just what contradictions the
restitutionary argument involves, for the circumstances he is
describing would support the argument given for the existence of
the legitimate interest in Hendrix! If there is no substitute on the
market, damages may be inadequate and an argument for some
form of literal enforcement may arise.62 It is the fact that there is a
substitute to be found on the market that will likely mean that the
claimant’s loss will be met with adequate damages, and therefore
that, as Peter Gibson L.J. has it, ‘‘the claimant would have
diﬃculty in establishing ﬁnancial loss’’ [para. 58].
It is a very serious mistake to conﬁne one’s concept of eﬃcient
breach to those breaches whereby the defendant hopes to realise an
extra proﬁt.63 The same eﬃciency lies behind breaches whereby the
defendant hopes to avoid extra expense.64 If these breaches fall
subject to the restitutionary critique, the consequences would be
disastrous. This clearly emerges if we consider the following
hypothetical but absolutely straightforward cases. The defendant
agrees to deliver generic goods to the claimant for a price of £1 m.
Part of the factory in which he intended to make the goods is then
destroyed by ﬁre, and, were he to try to perform his obligations by
rescheduling his production in order to still make the goods
himself, it would cost him £1.5 m. to do so. These goods are
available on the market for £1.1 m. The rational thing to do is to
breach. On ‘‘traditional’’ damages rules, the defendant will be liable
for £100,000 market damages, that sum representing, of course, the
excess of the claimant’s payment to a third party seller over the
contract price, and it is rational for the defendant to breach
because this is smaller than the £500,000 extra expense which actual
61 There appears to be an unsatisfactory concession to just this eﬀect in The Sine Nomine itself:
[2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 805, at [10].
62 Harris et al., note 7 above, pt. 3.
63 Ibid., chs. 1, 17 (esp. pp. 11–17). The argument of these chapters is run together to make the
point polemically in Campbell and Harris, note 33 above.
64 Pace E. McKendrick, ‘‘Breach of Contract, Restitution for Wrongs, and Punishment’’ in
Burrows and Peel (eds.), note 22 above, p. 106 n. 72, readers may care to reﬂect on The
Puerto Buitrago [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 250, 254–255, in which it was denied that a claimant
had a ‘‘legitimate interest’’ (in the sense of Lord Reid’s dicta in White and Carter (Councils)
Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] A.C. 413, 431; discussed in Harris et al., note 7 above, pp. 160–165)
in obtaining speciﬁc performance when damages were an adequate remedy. This case is the
mirror image of The Sine Nomine, and the reasons why it was right to conﬁne the claimant to
compensatory damages in The Purto Buitrago apply to The Sine Nomine. Blake and Hendrix
would reverse the meaning of ‘‘legitimate interest’’, from being an obstacle the claimant must
clear to be awarded a remedy in excess of compensatory damages to a reason for awarding
him such a remedy.
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performance would cause him. It is overall eﬃcient that he do so
because, whilst the defendant saves, the claimant suﬀers no loss of
expectation. On a ﬁrst look, and certainly so far as the appeal
courts in Blake and Hendrix envisage, even the wider scope of
restitutionary damages should cause no problem here.
But let us imagine that the goods were available on the market
for £1 m. The defendant will a fortiori wish to breach, but things
are very diﬀerent from the restitutionary perspective. The claimant
now has no loss on compensatory rules, and it is diﬃcult to see
why this will not generate a restitutionary claim. It is not good
enough to say that he really has no loss for if, perhaps inﬂuenced
by Hendrix, the claimant says he cannot prove one, how are we to
disagree? For argument’s sake we might allow that some sort of
arrangement for compulsory disclosure may provide a way around
this (though things are getting very, very far fetched indeed), but
the underlying theoretical problem cannot be solved. For even if we
establish that the claimant really is compensated by nominal
damages because he did not, in fact, suﬀer a substantial loss, the
defendant has not had to pay for the hypothetical release from his
obligation to deliver by which he made a saving of £500,000. He
has compensated the normal expectation loss but not paid a sum in
addition to this for release. And once this is allowed, then it
equally applies if the market price were £1.1 m., for the defendant
did not pay for the hypothetical release which allowed him to make
a net saving of £400,000 (£500,000–£100,000) in that circumstance.
It is, we submit, impossible to distinguish these two cases on the
ground that in one of them compensatory damages are nominal;
the logic of disgorgement of wrongful proﬁts must apply to both
(and if it applied to merely one it would still be completely
unacceptable). It is principally for this reason that the Blake
argument now extended in Hendrix was called ‘‘ridiculous in itself ’’
in earlier work, because if the defendant has to pay for release in
these cases, commercial law as we have it will collapse.65
This collapse is brought closer by Hendrix, but it always was
implicit in the wider availability of restitutionary remedies for
breach of contract regarded as a wrong.66 In the restitution
literature,67 this issue has so far principally surfaced in the
questions raised against what once seemed as axiomatic as damages
65 Harris et al., note 7 above, p. 267.
66 Pace Burrows, note 24 above, p. 486 n. 18 and McKendrick, note 64 above, p. 105 n. 68.
67 P. Birks, ‘‘Inconsistency Between Compensation and Restitution’’ (1996) 112 L.Q.R. 375, 378;
Burrows, note 24 above, p. 463 n. 7; A. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract,
2nd. edn. (London 1994), p. 305 (but cf. 1st. edn., 1987, 268–269), A. Burrows, Understanding
the Law of Obligations (Oxford 1998), pp. 40–44; A. Burrows and E. McKendrick, Cases and
Materials on the Law of Restitution (Oxford 1997), p. 581 n. 4; Law Commission, Aggravated,
Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (Report No. 247, 1997), paras. 3.64–3.72 and A.M.
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being compensatory: that awarding compensatory damages and an
account for the same breach involves double recovery.68 Of course,
once they appreciate the consequences of carrying through the logic
of their treatment of this ‘‘election of damages’’ problem, the
advocates of restitution will not want this implication to be
realised,69 and they may partially resile by inventing defences to
restitutionary claims which, in essence, mimic the ﬂexibility of the
expectation award.70 Certainly the advocates of restitution are
suﬃciently sophisticated to be able to advance theories which will
do this.71 But it will be pointless. At its best, it would not deliver
any of the economy of doctrine which we have always been told is
the point of the restitutionary eﬀort,72 for we would have to go
round the houses which the restitution eﬀort is now beginning to
construct whereas we hitherto have been spared that labour. But
furthermore, what one has seen of the incoherence produced just by
carrying the legitimate interest from Blake to Hendrix—not to
speak of the points about the defendant’s conduct—makes one
certain that things will become much worse in the sense that the
journey round the houses may be very long and diﬃcult indeed.
This point is, we are afraid to say, emphatically rubbed in if one
turns, as we now do, from the conditions of making a
restitutionary award at all to what Hendrix tells us of how to
determine whether partial or total disgorgement is appropriate.
4. LIABILITY FOR TOTAL DISGORGEMENT
If one allows that liability to a restitutionary remedy was
established in Hendrix, then the availability of the sliding scale
poses a novel choice: should there be partial or total disgorgement
when both are available? If any restitutionary remedy was to be
given in Blake, the exceptional nature of Blake’s conduct meant
that it had to be total disgorgement. In Hendrix, the Court of
Tettenborn, ‘‘Bribery, Corruption and Restitution: The Strange Case of Mr. Mahesan’’ (1979)
95 L.Q.R. 68, 72.
68 Tang Min Sit v. Capacious Investments Ltd. [1996] 1 A.C. 514, 521B–D. All practitioners’
texts, e.g. Mehigan and Griﬃths, note 49 above, p. 320, have so far accepted without demur
the impossibility of combining expectation damages and an account, but one now expects this
to change (for a while).
69 Though, of course, welcoming Blake heartily, the sixth edition of Goﬀ and Jones (note 40
above, paras. 20.024–20.034a) does not alter its basic conceptual architecture to accommodate
it (Ibid., para. 1.095).
70 M.G. Bridge, ‘‘Restitution and Retrospective Law’’ (1999) 14 Butterworths Journal of
International Banking and Financial Law 5, 8.
71 E.g. there is a line traceable between Tettenborn, note 67 above, 70, 72 and Law Commission,
note 67 above, para. 3.62, of ﬁnding a place for the defence which could be based on the
allowance given in equity for the defendant’s skill and eﬀort (Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2
A.C. 46) expended in realising a proﬁt by eﬃcient breach.
72 P. Birks, ‘‘Deﬁnition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13’’ in P. Birks (ed.), The
Classiﬁcation of Obligations (Oxford 1997), ch. 1.
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Appeal seems to proceed on the basis of determining whether the
defendant’s conduct was as exceptional as Blake’s, for if so, it
would lead to total disgorgement through an account of proﬁts.
However, as it decides that that conduct was not ‘‘exceptional to
the point where the Court should order a full account of all
proﬁts’’ [para. 44], it concludes that only the less serious remedy of
partial disgorgement is appropriate [paras. 44, 55]. We shall return
to this way of approaching the matter, but for the moment let us
look at the reasons why it was decided that Hendrix merited only
partial disgorgement.
Three reasons are given [para. 37; cf. para. 29], but, with
respect, they reduce to one. The ﬁrst two reasons are that Hendrix
is not as ‘‘sensitive’’ as a national security case, nor involves as
much notoriety. We shall see that the second of these reasons may,
in fact, be questionable, but even allowing both, they cannot take
us very far. Hopefully almost every case that will ever be heard will
be distinguishable from Blake on this basis, and certainly every
normal commercial case of the sort that caused concern to Lord
Hobhouse will be. We are left with the third reason, that ‘‘there is
no direct analogy between PPX’s position and that of a ﬁduciary’’.
We are in deep waters indeed here, and the precise way this is
put by Mance L.J. is important. It is not obvious that there was a
private law interest (based on Blake’s signing the Oﬃcial Secrets
Act as a condition of obtaining employment with the security
services) in Blake at all.73 But even allowing that there was, it was
categorically found that Blake was not a ﬁduciary.74 This is but
grudgingly recognised in Hendrix [para. 29], but, of course, this is
the signiﬁcance of Blake as a restitutionary case. Had Blake been a
ﬁduciary, an account of proﬁts would have been awarded against
him at ﬁrst instance.75 Leaving aside the extraordinary features of
Blake, it is completely settled that an account may be awarded for
breach of a ﬁduciary duty. The entire doctrinal point of Blake is
that the House of Lords awarded an account for a simple breach
of contract.
The advance of restitution must be somewhat undermined if,
having in Blake got rid of the necessity of ﬁnding a ﬁduciary
obligation to justify the award of an account of proﬁts, one found
that necessity restored in Hendrix.76 And it is this that Mance L.J.’s
73 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [1997] Ch. 84, 93B (Ch.D).
74 Ibid., 91E–96D.
75 Ibid., 96E–97A.
76 It may well be possible to construct an argument on the basis of a close reading of Mance
L.J.’s judgment that adheres to the distinction between restitution and disgorgement: see note
24 above. It is hard, however, to recover a ratio from Hendrix that does so, and impossible to
do so from the judgment of Peter Gibson L.J. Most importantly, the logic of the wrongful
proﬁts argument informing Hendrix undermines this distinction, as we are arguing.
618 The Cambridge Law Journal [2003]
careful wording seeks to avoid. In Blake, Lord Nicholls found that
Blake’s contractual obligation not to disclose oﬃcial information
was ‘‘closely akin to a ﬁduciary obligation, where an account of
proﬁts is a standard remedy in the event of breach’’, and this is
drawn upon in Hendrix [para. 29] to distinguish PPX’s breach, for,
it will be recalled: ‘‘there is no direct analogy between PPX’s
position and that of a ﬁduciary’’. There are, of course, tolerably
settled if hardly immutable rules about what does and what does
not constitute a ﬁduciary relationship. But no direct reference to
these rules would be to the purpose here, for the last thing we are
able to do is argue that PPX was a ﬁduciary; we must show it was
in a position analogous to a ﬁduciary.
But, of course, if a party analogous to a ﬁduciary gets a remedy
previously given only to ﬁduciaries, then in the sense most
important in the common law that party is a ﬁduciary: ubi
remedium ibi jus. And for this reason Hendrix is the latest in the
line of restitutionary arguments that have had the eﬀect of
broadening the class of ﬁduciaries, the second to do so in reliance
on what prior to Blake would have been thought a ﬂat
contradiction or a misuse of terms77 but which Blake clearly makes
possible: ‘‘the characterisation of a contractual obligation as
ﬁduciary’’.78 We do not want to enter into the argument in
principle here, for what we would say in defence of the ‘‘self-
denying ordinance’’79 which we believe should be observed here has
been said by others:80 ‘‘Fiduciary duties should not be
superimposed on . . . common law duties simply to improve the
nature or extent of the remedy’’.81 What we want to point to is the
absurdity of treating the facts of Hendrix as justifying the extension
of ﬁduciary obligations.
The, as it were, ethical atmosphere of Blake was dominated by
concern not to allow a person to proﬁt from wrongdoing which
involved despicable conduct. It was no technical issue of the nature
of the wrong involved in breach of contract that guided the Court
of Appeal and the House of Lords in Blake. But as Lord
Hobhouse pointed out in Blake,82 it is wrong to allow the search
for a ‘‘just response’’83 or ‘‘practical justice’’84 to dominate appeal
77 Lord Millett, ‘‘Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce’’ (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 214, 225.
78 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 285G (H.L.).
79 S. Worthington, ‘‘Fiduciaries: When is Self-denial Obligatory?’’ [1999] C.L.J. 500.
80 S. Worthington, ‘‘Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs’’ (1999) 62 M.L.R. 218 and S.
Worthington, and R. Goode, ‘‘Commercial Law: Conﬁning the Remedial Boundaries’’ in D.
Hayton (ed.), Law’s Future(s) (Oxford 2000), ch. 15.
81 Norberg v. Wynrib (1992) 92 D.L.R. (4th.) 449, 481.
82 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 299F (H.L.).
83 Ibid., 287G.
84 Ibid., 292C.
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court reasoning even in the circumstances of Blake, and, even more
than this, there is the question of the precedent doing so sets for
other cases.85
In Hendrix, the Court of Appeal is pleased that it has obtained
‘‘practical justice’’ [para. 42] by preventing the ‘‘anomalous and
unjust’’ outcome of PPX avoiding paying for the use of the master
copies ‘‘by simply breaching the agreement’’ [para. 43]. But Buckley
J. was quite right to conclude that he ‘‘could not begin to
compare’’ Hendrix with Blake,86 for the cases are very diﬀerent
indeed. Some detail of the career of Jimi Hendrix beyond that to
be found in the judgments is very helpful here.87 The settlement
which PPX breached by exploiting the recordings was, as we have
said, of litigation PPX had brought against Hendrix for breach of
an exclusive service agreement entered into in 1965. There can be
no doubt that Hendrix deliberately breached this agreement; indeed
this breach is quite a famous episode in the history of rock music.
Regretting the 1965 agreement virtually as soon as he made it,
Hendrix almost immediately and repeatedly broke it by playing
outside of its conﬁnes surreptitiously. It was whilst playing in his
own band under the alias of Jimmy James in Greenwich Village in
June 1966 that Hendrix was ‘‘discovered’’ by Chas Chandler, a very
well established rock musician. Chandler then took Hendrix from
New York to London and there formed and promoted the Jimi
Hendrix Experience, the band which provided the platform for
Hendrix’s great success.
Hendrix’s playing when he was discovered and during the period
when the Jimi Hendrix Experience shot to fame was all in clear
breach of the 1965 agreement, and, especially until the 1973
settlement, Hendrix or those with rights derived from him were in
constant dispute with Mr. Chalpin. In (the admittedly all more or
less hagiographic) biographies of Hendrix, Mr. Chalpin is always
criticised and the 1965 agreement is always referred to as
‘‘punitive’’, ‘‘ill-advised’’, ‘‘miserly’’, etc.88 That agreement
unarguably had a great deal of the quality made familiar by
Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay.89 In Hendrix, Mance
L.J. hints [paras. 7, 39] that it was an exploitative agreement.
85 Ibid., 299D–E.
86 Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc., Edward Chalpin [2002] EWHC 1353 (Q.B.),
at [50].
87 In his capacity as one of the leading authorities on the career of Jim Hendrix, Mr. Paddy
Ireland has referred us to H. Shapiro and C. Glebbeek, Jimi Hendrix: Electric Gypsy (London
1995), pp. 95–107 as the best account of this period of Hendrix’s career. (See also the other
entries for ‘‘Chalpin’’ in the index). We have read other biographies of Hendrix and their
accounts of this period do not materially diﬀer from Shapiro and Glebbeek, although all have
a more histrionic tone.
88 These epithets are taken from the biography of Hendrix in the BBC’s Music Artist Database.
89 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308.
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Nevertheless, it was an agreement, and it was not set aside90 but
settled on terms which divided the beneﬁts and burdens between
the parties. The current litigation therefore arises to protect rights
which certainly were obtained by breach, and, what is more, a
deliberate (indeed a repeated, deceitful and prolonged in the face of
the non-breaching party’s manifest disapproval) breach which
would be regarded as a notorious episode in the history of rock
music were it not that such breaches by artists are generally viewed
positively by those who write that history. If this was not enough,
it seems clear that had Hendrix been more forthright at the outset,
all this litigation could have been avoided. Chandler sought to buy
Hendrix out of all his commitments (he was under contract to
others in addition to PPX), but was unintentionally or otherwise
deceived by Hendrix, who did not tell him about Chalpin.91 There
can be little doubt that at that time Hendrix could have been
bought out of his commitments to Chalpin for a pittance.
Mance L.J. evidently did not feel the analogy between Blake
and Hendrix was strong enough to justify an account, but he must
have believed it strong enough to justify the hypothetical release
damages which come lower down the sliding scale. But it is, we feel
obliged to say, simply ridiculous to hold that any analogy can be
drawn between Blake and Hendrix for the purposes of legitimating
any restitutionary remedy. Blake is an absolutely outre´ case to
which only one previous case in recent English litigation can be
compared, the Spycatcher case, where the use of the same
restitutionary argument92 was advocated.93 In our opinion, although
Blake’s turpitude does not excuse what was done in Blake, no-one
can fail to sympathise with the motivation behind the decision. But
the corollary of depicting the breach as a wrong which generates
the ‘‘temptation to do justice’’94 must be that the claimant is clearly
90 Mance L.J. at one point observes that ‘‘the litigation about the agreement dated 15th.
October 1965 was not going well for PPX’’ [para. 39]. We are unable to do more than
speculate on the basis of what we know of the 1965 agreement, but it would appear that any
such diﬃculties must stem from the Schroeder v. Macaulay quality of that agreement leading
PPX’s counsel to fear the court would not take too harsh a view of Hendrix’s breach; i.e. the
exact opposite of that view of breach which cases like Hendrix are seeking to promote: cf.
Campbell, note 38 above, 139–140. The settlement of the US part of the earlier litigation is,
however, described as follows in Shapiro and Glebbeek, note 87 above, p. 291: ‘‘[whether the
1965 agreement was enforceable] was never put to the test; Chalpin pressed his suit against
Warner Brothers [whose rights were derived from Hendrix] in America, who rolled over and
settled. Why? Possibly because, having seen Jimi’s earning potential, they didn’t want to take
any chances of lengthy litigation putting a freeze on their ability to release his material and
earn them far more than they could ever lose in court. There was also a risk that the court
would ﬁnd in favour of Ed Chalpin and declare all subsequent agreements null and void. So
Ed Chalpin received a very favourable settlement’’.
91 Ibid., p. 106
92 P. Birks, ‘‘A Lifelong Obligation of Conﬁdence’’ (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 501.
93 A.-G. v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109.
94 N. Andrews, ‘‘Civil Disgorgement of Wrongdoers’ Gains: The Temptation to do Justice’’ in
W.R. Cornish et al. (eds.), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Oxford 1998), ch. 10.
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in an ethically superior position, and this is the import of the
description of the non-breaching party in Blake as ‘‘innocent’’.95
However, it will never be black and white in this way when it
comes to applying Blake to more usual commercial cases. Hendrix
merely takes to an extreme the incoherence which is bound to
follow from disregarding the core aim of the law of contract, to
give eﬀect to the agreement of the parties, in order to respond to
what are wrongs according to the restitutionary reclassiﬁcation of
obligations. It is a most important virtue of freedom of contract
that it allows the court to avoid this incoherence by avoiding, so
far as is possible,96 the imposition of exogenous moral criteria on
commercial dealings at all.
That we are obliged to point this out in a comment on a
decision of the Court of Appeal would be remarkable had it not
long been clear that this replacement of the parties’ valuations of
their conduct by exogenous ones supplied by restitutionary theories
of unjust enrichment, wrongfulness, corrective justice, etc. is at the
heart of the restitutionary recasting of remedies for breach.97
Hendrix is not the worst example we have so far seen. Disapproval
of City of New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Association98 played
a large part in getting the argument for the expansion of restitution
going in this country,99 and clearly formed part of the mental
atmosphere of Blake.100 Rearrangement of the outcome of this case
was advocated, although this was a contract which was not even
breached!101 At least in Hendrix there was a breach, albeit a breach
of an obligation which the defendant undertook as a consequence
of the other party’s prior breach. This is, we suppose, an
improvement, but surely not suﬃcient to stir up the indignation
necessary to give colour to appeals to ‘‘practical justice’’. The
restitutionary argument takes us deep into territory which the
legitimacy of the law of contract has been based upon refusing to
enter, and Hendrix graphically shows us how wise that refusal has
been.
Hendrix is, then, a signal failure in its attempt to distinguish the
grounds on which a party in breach may be conﬁned to partial or
granted total disgorgement. All we know about these grounds are
95 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 278 (H.L.).
96 D. Campbell and H. Collins, ‘‘Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts’’ in D.
Campbell et al. (eds.), The Implicit Dimensions of Contract (Oxford 2003), ch. 2.
97 H. Collins, ‘‘Legal Classiﬁcations as the Products of Knowledge Systems’’ in Birks (ed.), note
72 above, ch. 3.
98 9 So. 486 (1891).
99 G. Jones, ‘‘The Recovery of Beneﬁts Gained from a Breach of Contract’’ (1983) 99 L.Q.R.
443, 455.
100 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [1998] Ch. 439, 458D–E (C.A.).
101 Harris et al., note 7, pp. 277–278.
622 The Cambridge Law Journal [2003]
that they must be more vague than the grounds upon which we
have previously identiﬁed a ﬁduciary relationship; they need only be
analogous to such a relationship. We learn nothing of the extent of
the analogy except that it involves some sort of moral
disapprobation connected to wrongfulness. What little had
previously emerged about the boundaries of wrongfulness102 cannot
but be obfuscated by Hendrix’s ﬁnding that rights acquired by
breach come within those boundaries! This is, we are sorry to have
to conclude, a joke at the expense of a restitutionary argument
which is intended to remove ‘‘discretionary remedialism’’103 from
the law.
5. THE SLIDING SCALE IN PRACTICE
This regrettable situation does not exhaust all that is unsatisfactory
about Hendrix. So far we have looked at its shortcomings for
defendants. We must now turn to its shortcomings for claimants in
general, and Experience Hendrix LLC in particular.
The doctrinal attractions of the sliding scale are obvious:
restitutionary remedies following breach appear to be theoretically
uniﬁed into a scale and coherent damages quantiﬁcations would
seem to follow. But, partly because the gap between the
hypothetical release and an account of proﬁts cannot actually be
smoothed away, these attractions have very little practical substance
indeed; and once this is realised, the entire ediﬁce collapses. When
the claimant turned away from compensatory remedies because of
quantiﬁcation problems and sought an account, surely it was
implicit that the account would be easier to quantify. But, of
course, long experience of accounts shows that this is not so.104 An
important subsidiary issue in Hendrix was the claimant’s attempt to
enlist the Court’s assistance in securing the information needed to
obtain an account, the claimant having no conﬁdence in an
undertaking to account provided by the defendant [paras. 47–49].
Hendrix is in an area which is the natural habitat of search and
freezing orders, the ‘‘nuclear weapons’’ of commercial litigation.105
As has been said in previous work:
an account of proﬁts in practice suﬀers from defects similar to
those encountered in quantifying damages for loss of future
business. Logically, the plausibility of this remedy rests on [the
claimant] being able to provide evidence of the gains [the
defendant] has made by his wrongful conduct, and this must
102 S. Hedley, Restitution (London 2001), esp. ch. 4.
103 P. Birks, ‘‘Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism’’ (2001) 29 W.A.L.R. 1.
104 Price’s Patent Candle Co. Ltd. v. Bauwen’s Patent Candle Co. Ltd. (1858) 70 E.R. 302, 303.
105 Bank Mellat v. Naipur [1985] F.S.R. 87, 92.
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encounter proof problems analogous to those [the claimant’s]
own expectation claim must encounter, with the added very
serious complication that the evidence must be sought from
[the defendant], who obviously will not wish to provide it.106
To turn from an expectation claim to an account is to jump out
of the frying pan into the ﬁre; but if one turns away from an
expectation claim to hypothetical release, the case is even worse: a
jump into the blast furnace. Consideration of the cases shows that,
in the face of the want of evidence, the Court has often reached
some very rough and ready quantiﬁcations of accounts.107 But at
least in an account one has a clear goal of disgorging all of the
defendant’s gains. What proportion is to be disgorged for
hypothetical release? We do not want to dwell on a point that has
been extensively discussed in earlier work but merely sum up the
conclusion of that work: what has so far prevailed in hypothetical
release cases since Wrotham Park is complete arbitrariness made
tolerable by moderation, and there is no way whatsoever in which
this can be changed.108
When awarding the claimant in Wrotham Park £2,500,109
Brightman J. acted in the usual way in Lord Cairns’ Act cases, for
faced with the necessity of making an award about which he could
say nothing except that it was ‘‘fair’’, he acted with ‘‘great
moderation’’. However, the fact that Brightman J. knew that, by
awarding £2,500, he was awarding 5 per cent. of the £50,000 the
defendant expected to make by its breach, was most unusual in
modern hypothetical release cases. In most such cases, no evidence
of the defendant’s proﬁt has been available, and so the ‘‘remedy’’ has
been the purest guesswork: an arbitrary apportionment of a sum
which is not even known. One awaits the conclusion of the
litigation in Hendrix with interest, for so far it too has been a case
in which there has been no evidence of the proﬁt the defendant
made by breach [para. 14].
The conclusion which must be faced is that Hendrix manifests
the gross logical fallacy at the heart of the legitimate interest point.
If the legitimate interest is generated by the diﬃculty of
consequential loss quantiﬁcation, then to turn from this to an
account, where evidential diﬃculties routinely lead to very rough
and ready approximations, or to hypothetical release damages, the
conceptual diﬃculties of which typically have led to the
abandonment even of a pretence of principled quantiﬁcation, is, we
106 Harris et al., above note 7, p. 571.
107 E.g. Normalec Ltd. v. Britton [1983] F.S.R. 318; discussed in Campbell, note 38 above, 136 n.
27.
108 Harris et al., note 7 above, pp. 268–272, 491–494.
109 Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798, 815–816.
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are sorry to say, lamentable. It would always be possible to provide
a compensatory damages quantiﬁcation if one only had to achieve
the standard of what is commonly done in the quantiﬁcation of
accounts and of hypothetical damages,110 and therefore the whole
argument just falls. The explanation of why this logical absurdity
has been put forward in Hendrix must refer to the hidden text in
the case, or rather to two hidden texts. The ﬁrst is the, as it were,
academic text: Hendrix is a vehicle for the promotion of
restitution,111 and one can see what is being done here. The
practical text is more complicated.
Before the thoughts of a number of leading academics,
practitioners and judges became so focused upon restitution, a
claimant facing a situation where he feared he would be
inadequately compensated by a compensatory damages award
would seek literal enforcement, and in a case like Hendrix the
appropriate remedy was the injunction which was indeed obtained.
A prohibitory injunction is, of course, a remedy for the future, in
this case against ‘‘yet further exploitation’’112 of the recordings. It
might be the case that between the breach and the judgment, the
defendant had made proﬁts by the breach, and, in the right case,
he could be made to disgorge these ‘‘past proﬁts’’ by an account of
proﬁts as a supplemental equitable remedy. This is what is sought
in Hendrix [para. 36]. Though the transcripts of the case do not
allow one to be certain,113 it would seem likely that the claimant
did not originally seek to supplement its injunction with an account
[para. 14], and when it amended its statement of claim to do so,
perhaps inﬂuenced by the very harsh comments Professor Birks has
made about equity,114 or by the atmosphere left by those
comments, it framed that claim in a most thoroughly restitutionary
way, directly upon Blake.
We recall that as a ﬁrst alternative to the compensatory damages
which it maintained would be nominal, the claimant asked for an
award on ‘‘the Wrotham Park Estates basis’’, or, as a second
alternative, for an account on the authority of Blake. It is, with due
respect, not obvious why it did so. It did obtain partial
disgorgement via hypothetical release, but, unless Experience
Hendrix LLC receives novel treatment indeed when the damages
110 E.g. Joseph v. National Magazine Co. Ltd. [1959] 1 Ch. 14, 21.
111 This point in particular, but also a number of the other points made in this article, have
been indicated by Mr. Hedley in comments he has made on the Restitution Discussion
Group email forum: note 20 above.
112 Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc., Edward Chalpin [2002] EWHC 1353 (Q.B.),
at [45].
113 The relationship of Hendrix to Island Records Ltd. v. Tring International plc. [1995] F.S.R.
560 is unclear.
114 P. Birks, ‘‘Equity, Conscience and Use’’ (1999) 23 Melb. U.L. Rev. 1, 21–22.
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are quantiﬁed—as seemingly encouraged by Mance L.J. at para.
[46]—it will obtain a very moderate award. The awards so far made
on a Wrotham Park basis have been so moderate that it is hard to
distinguish them from nominal damages,115 and so to see in what
way they really diﬀer from the compensatory award and therefore
what the point of them is.116 The award of £2,500 in Wrotham Park
itself worked out at £116 per house and the defendant kept a
margin of £47,500 from the gains yielded by the breach. A result
like this may well fail to satisfy Experience Hendrix LLC. Parallels
to hypothetical release damages are, of course, available in
situations like Hendrix without reliance on restitution, either for
breach of common law restraint of trade117 or under some
provision related to intellectual property,118 and they may well be
higher,119 though admittedly quantiﬁcations are so woolly in these
‘‘licence damages’’ cases that it is hard to be precise.120
If the claimant had obtained total disgorgement via an account
of proﬁts, no doubt it would have been better pleased, and it is not
clear to us from the merits as we are able to understand them from
the materials available to us why it did not try to get this by
pleading an infringement of an intellectual property right or even
by passing oﬀ.121 In this way it could have tried to get that account
by relying on statute or settled equitable authority rather than by
relying on the winner of the very strongly contested prize of most
controversial contract case decided by the House of Lords in the
last twenty years.
115 There is an exception which proves the rule: Marine and General Mutual Life Assurance
Society v. St. James Real Estate Co. [1991] 2 E.G.L.R. 178; discussed in Harris et al., note 7
above, p. 494.
116 Ibid., pp. 268–272, 491–494 and Campbell, note 51 above, 264–265.
117 Seager v. Copydex (No. 2) [1969] R.P.C. 250.
118 The Court of Appeal in Hendrix would have been receptive to an argument under the
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 [paras. 39–40]. In Redrow Homes Ltd. v. Betts
Bothers plc. [1999] 1 A.C. 197, it was held that normal compensatory damages under the
1988 Act, s. 96(2) and ‘‘additional’’ damages under s. 97(2) were available only in the
alternative to an account of proﬁts.
119 In Ludlow Music Inc. v. Williams (No. 2) [2002] E.M.L.R. 29, at [57–59], Pumfrey J. denied
additional damages under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 97(2). However,
believing himself not to be tightly bound by the tradition of moderation in awarding
equitable damages and being inclined to ‘‘err on the side of generosity to the claimant’’
(Ludlow, loc. cit., at para. [48]), he awarded (in addition to an injunction) a 25 per cent.
royalty under s. 96(2) (Ibid., at para. [66]).
120 This aspect of Hendrix is discussed at length in an unpublished paper by Professor Jaﬀey,
‘‘Disgorgement and ‘Licence Fee Damages’ in Contract’’.
121 Uncontested evidence for the claimant given by one Mr. McDermott [para. 14] raises the
suspicion that the PPX recordings were marketed in a misleading way, in eﬀect as ‘‘Jimi
Hendrix’’ records when in fact they were ‘‘Curtis Knight’’ records, and it would appear that
an English passing oﬀ action relating to this evidence succeeded in 1968: Shapiro and
Glebbeek, note 87 above, pp. 290–291. It is diﬃcult to see that suﬃcient sums would have
been involved to justify continuation of these proceedings after the injunction had been
awarded unless these recordings were sold as ‘‘Jimi Hendrix’’ recordings.
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Much of what Mance L.J. says in Hendrix [paras. 39–41] leads
one to believe that he would have looked sympathetically on
‘‘IPish’’ arguments. But no doubt there were all sorts of diﬃculties
with these arguments of which we are unaware which prevented the
claimant from pursuing them.122 For present purposes, the point is
that to do so the claimant would have had to show something in
addition to simple breach of contract to gain the remedy; the
tortious element of passing oﬀ or the intellectual property right.
The point of the claimant’s argument in Hendrix is to make all this
unnecessary by making these additional factors unnecessary, just as
Blake purported to make the additional factor of a ﬁduciary
relationship unnecessary, and therefore obtain the wider remedy for
simple breach of contract. As the account of proﬁts was not
awarded in Hendrix, we are left in the ‘‘analogous to a ﬁduciary’’
half-way house. But, having, we believe, raised serious objections to
treating Hendrix as anything other than a contract case if the
additional element could not be shown, we wish to generalise from
this to say that it is important that what has so far been erected of
the half-way house should be demolished rather than that we
proceed to its completion.
In World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation
Entertainment Inc.,123 heard about a year before Hendrix, Jacob J.,
we respectfully submit, took the right line.124 A claimant who had
been awarded an injunction for breach of a restraint of trade also
sought to amend its statement of claim to seek an account on the
authority of Blake. Like so many cases in the truly burgeoning
areas of business information and intellectual property law, W.W.F.
does not ﬁt comfortably into the existing legal categories, which are
continually being stretched by highly competent claimants’ counsel
pleading to usually extremely receptive commercial courts. The
restraint was, in essence, over the use of the initials ‘‘W.W.F.’’
shared by the parties, and so had some of the colour of a
trademark case, although Jacob J. quite rightly insisted this was a
restraint case. Having done so, he distinguished W.W.F. from Blake
and denied the account in clear terms:
[In W.W.F.] all one really has . . . is a negative covenant. The
fact that it relates to the use of initials and so is a bit
‘‘trademarkish’’ or ‘‘IPish’’ does not mean the common law
should provide what Parliament provides by statute for an
122 We are grateful to Mr. Howard Johnson for describing to us in detail what these may have
been.
123 World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2002] F.S.R.
32. The Court of Appeal aﬃrmed the granting of the injunction, but there was no cross-
appeal as to account: [2002] F.S.R. 33.
124 Pace McKendrick, note 64 above, pp. 106–107.
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infringement of a registered mark or intellectual property right
. . . I conclude that the proposed amendment should not be
allowed.125
Anyone at all familiar with intellectual property law will see
many parallels between the language of that law and the language
now being used in the argument for the widening of restitution.
Restitutionary arguments often cast longing looks at the account of
proﬁts remedy as it is applied in intellectual property cases,126 and
the extension of intellectual property reasoning to simple contracts
was clearly invited by Lord Nicholls’ speech in Blake.127 We would
no longer have ‘‘breach’’ but rather ‘‘wilful infringement’’ by a
‘‘cynical and deliberate’’ ‘‘wrongdoer’’ or ‘‘pirate’’. These parallels
certainly are strong, but rather than this being to the good, it
should scream out a warning about what is being proposed. It is
not merely that our leading intellectual property judges are
presently arguing that copyright in particular already gives
claimants excessive rights;128 nor that the economic and legal
justiﬁcations for intellectual property are questionable.129 It is that,
for good or ill, intellectual property rights are not based on
contractual relationships but on monopolies granted by the state on
the grounds that it is necessary to radically intervene in what would
be the outcome of competition. Despite the vulgar understanding to
the contrary, intellectual property rights are not of the market but
oust the market, and this should make us extremely cautious about
extending remedies thought appropriate in that sphere to simple
contract, for simple contract is, of course, the legal foundation of
competition.
6. CONCLUSION
By not attempting to use the arguments that were available to it
prior to Blake, Experience Hendrix LLC may have allowed an
academic agenda to take precedence over a practical one; but this
triumph of the academic over the practical is something that
certainly characterises Blake, and was said in Blake about the line
125 World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2002] F.S.R.
32, at [63].
126 A. Tettenborn, Law of Restitution, 3rd. edn. (London 2002), pp. 253–255.
127 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 278D-280F (H.L.).
128 Hon. Sir Robin Jacob, ‘‘The Onward March of Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies’’
in R.C. Dreyfuss et al. (eds.), Exploring the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Oxford 2001),
ch. 17 and Mr. Justice Laddie, ‘‘Copyright: Over-strength, Over-regulated, Over-rated’’ (1996)
5 European Intellectual Property Review 253.
129 S. Picciotto and D. Campbell, ‘‘Whose Molecule Is It Anyway? Private and Social
Perspectives on Intellectual Property’’ in A. Hudson (ed.), New Perspectives on Property Law:
Obligations and Restitution (London 2003), ch. 14.
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of cases stretching back to Wrotham Park.130 This is not to say
Hendrix was ‘‘academic’’ in the sense of having no costs. Hendrix
shows that we are in the midst of the period of very expensive
mischief 131 which will have to be endured whilst the attempt to
place remedies for breach of contract on a restitutionary basis
works its way out of the appeal courts. One may frame the hope
that this is happening quickly, and indeed there is a striking
parallel between the brilliant but quickly vanishing eﬄorescence of
the career of Jimi Hendrix and the career of restitution for the
wrong of breach of contract in the appeal courts. There was a
distinct loss of conﬁdence in the ‘‘skimping’’ and ‘‘doing what one
promised not to do’’ arguments between the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords’ hearings of Blake, and that these arguments
still play a role in Hendrix is inconsistent with what is explicitly
said of them in that case. The ‘‘legitimate interest’’ argument which
Hendrix emphasises also involves, we say with all respect, manifest
inconsistencies. We do not wish to argue that expectation damages
work perfectly well, or even as well as one imagines a reformed
system of remedies might work, but Hendrix is clear evidence that
the general restitutionary alternative is very markedly inferior. If
the remedy sought in Hendrix could have been obtained by means
available prior to Blake, Hendrix may be a pointless case. However
this is, dealing with it in a way heavily inﬂuenced by Blake has led
the Court of Appeal to produce a judgement that is, with all
respect, undermined by some very weak arguments.
That the career of restitution for wrongful breach of contract
shows signs of emulating the brevity of that of Jimi Hendrix
himself shows just how mistaken is the restitutionary eﬀort to
displace expectation in contract. By seeking to impose an external
criterion of wrongfulness on the parties’ conduct, substituting their
valuations of that conduct for the parties’ own, the proponents of
restitution are running against basic freedom of contract, and
therefore against the core of the legitimacy of the market economy
and the liberal democratic polity. Even the extremely distinguished
academics, practitioners and judges who have so exhorted
restitution for wrongs since Birks’ Introduction appeared in 1985132
are a really rather feeble force when opposed to this, and once they
realise what they have done in Blake, they will resile from it.
130 A.-G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 277H (H.L.).
131 D. Campbell, ‘‘Classiﬁcation and the Crisis of the Common Law’’ (1999) 26 J. Law and Soc.
369, 377.
132 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford 1985; rev. edn. 1989), ch. 10. It is
possible to trace the inﬂuence of this thinking back to Professor Birks’ 1982 Current Legal
Problems lecture: P Birks, ‘‘Restitution and Wrongs’’ [1982] C.L.P. 53.
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The striking parallel between the careers of Jim Hendrix and
restitution for wrongful breach will not, unfortunately, extend much
beyond their brevity. For any adult who places any value on rock
music, Hendrix has left a number of excellent songs. But
restitution’s general application to contract will yield nothing
positive. In the course of the appeal courts ﬁnding this out, we will
at least gain the beneﬁt of learning just how inappropriate general
restitutionary damages are to the market economy. But, of course,
serious reﬂection on the reason why expectation rather than
restitutionary damages became the default rule in contract remedies
in the ﬁrst place,133 and therefore are the legal basis of the market
economy, would have made this lesson unnecessary.
133 Harris et al., note 7 above, ch. 1.
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